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NOTES AND COMMENTS

STATE DURATIONAL RESIDENCE
REQUIREMENTS FOR DIVORCE: HOW LONG IS
TOO LONG?
State durational residence requirements for divorce by their very
nature divide residents into two classes, "old" and "new" residents,
distinguishable only by the length of time members of the respective
classes have resided in the state.' "New" residents are discriminated
against, in that they are absolutely prohibited from initiating divorce
proceedings.2 This discriminatory treatment, viewed in the light of
recent Supreme Court decisions involving restriction of individual
rights, 3 has provoked four recent challenges in the federal district
courts to the constitutionality of state residence requirements for
divorce. 4 Two district courts have upheld the validity of state statutes
requiring individuals to maintain specific periods of residency prior
to petitioning for divorce, 5 while two other district courts have declared similar requirements unconstitutional.' The latter tribunals
found that residence requirements for divorce either infringed upon
the constitutionally guaranteed right to travel, violating the equal
protection clause, 7 or denied access to the courts to those newly ar'Cf. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 334 (1972). Every state requires some period
of durational residency, varying from six weeks to two years, prior to the maintenance
of a divorce action. The residence period is sometimes shortened, e.g., ILL. ANN.STAT.
ch. 40, § 3 (1951), or waived, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.§ 46-15 (1969), for example
when the marriage was performed in the forum state, when the cause of action arises
there, or when both parties reside in the state and the respondent is personally served.
See V MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY passim (1973).
2Cf. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 334 (1972).
3
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (invalidating one-year residence requirement for voting); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (invalidating filing fee
requirement as applied to indigents seeking divorce); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618 (1969) (invalidating one-year residence requirement for receiving welfare).
'Larsen v. Gallogly, 361 F. Supp. 305 (D.R.I. 1973), appeal docketed, 42 U.S.L.W.
3257 (U.S. Oct. 23, 1973) (No. 73-678); Sosna v. Iowa, 360 F. Supp. 1182 (N.D. Iowa
1973), prob. juris.noted, 42 U.S.L.W. 3468 (U.S. Feb. 19, 1974) (No. 73-762); Mon Chi
Heung Au v. Lum, 360 F. Supp. 219 (D. Hawaii 1973); Shiffman v. Askew, 359 F. Supp.
1225 (M.D. Fla. 1973).
sSosna v. Iowa, 360 F. Supp. 1182 (N.D. Iowa 1973), prob. juris. noted, 42
U.S.L.W. 3468 (U.S. Feb. 19, 1974) (No. 73-762); Shiffman v. Askew, 359 F. Supp. 1225
(M.D. Fla. 1973) (upholding 1-year and 6-month requirements, respectively).
6Larsen v. Gallogly, 361 F. Supp. 305 (D.R.I. 1973), appeal docketed, 42 U.S.L.W.
3257 (U.S. Oct. 23, 1973) (No. 73-678); Mon Chi Heung Au v. Lum, 360 F. Supp. 219
(D. Hawaii 1973) (invalidating two- and one-year requirements, respectively). South
Dakota's one-year divorce residence requirement was recently invalidated as well. See
McCay v. South Dakota, 42 U.S.L.W. 2306 (D.S. Dak. Nov. 15, 1973).
'U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV: "No State shall . .. deny to any person within its

360

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXI

rived individuals seeking dissolution of their marriage relationship,
violating the due process clause.' The courts which upheld divorce
residence requirements generally concluded either that the infringement of the right to travel caused by the residence requirements was
negligible, or that despite the existence of some limitation on the
right to travel, the restriction was warranted by counterbalancing
state interests.
Determining the constitutional validity of durational residence
requirements involves an evaluation of both the state interests and
objectives urged in support of the requirements and the individual
rights and interests affected by the requirements. In the absence of a
clear Supreme Court mandate as to the validity of residence requirements for divorce, courts have drawn on two recent Supreme Court
decisions' which involved similar residency requirements for receiving welfare aid and for exercising the franchise. In both cases the
classifications which resulted from imposition of durational residence
requirements were examined under the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.'" The Court's analysis in each case necessitated a determination of the equal protection standard applicable to the particular classification in question.
The Supreme Court has enunciated two tests for determining the
validity under the equal protection clause of allegedly discriminatory
classifications. Under the "traditional" equal protection test, a classification is valid unless it is "without any reasonable basis, and
therefore is purely arbitrary."" This lenient standard requires no
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
'U.S. CONST. amend. XIV: "No State shall ...

deprive any person of life, liberty,

or property, without due process of law ....
"
'Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618

(1969).
"Note 7 supra.
"Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911). The Court there
explained four rules pertinent to the application of the traditional equal protection
test:
1. The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
does not take from the State the power to classify in the adoption of
police laws, but admits of the exercise of a wide scope of discretion in
that regard, and avoids what is done only when it is without any
reasonable basis and therefore is purely arbitrary. 2. A classification
having some reasonable basis does not offend against that clause
merely because it is not made with mathematical nicety or because
in practice it results in some inequality. 3. When the classification in
such a law is called in question, if any state of facts reasonably can
be conceived that would sustain it, the existence of that state of facts
at the time the law was enacted must be assumed. 4. One who assails
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precision and is rarely an obstacle to a finding of constitutional acceptability.2
However, when a classification is based upon inherently "suspect" criteria, such as race, or infringes upon a constitutionally guaranteed fundamental right, a stricter test must be met. Under this
"strict scrutiny" test, 3 the classification must be "necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest."" Once it has been established that a statute furthers a compelling state interest, a second
requirement must be satisfied: the statute must be "drawn with precision" so as to further the state interest by means least restrictive
of the constitutional right. 5
In both Supreme Court cases upon which the federal district
courts examining divorce residency requirements have relied, the
Court invalidated residence requirements under the strict scrutiny
standard after finding that the requirements impermissibly restricted
the classification in such a law must carry the burden of showing that
it does not rest upon any reasonable basis, but is essentially arbitrary.
Id. at 78-79. See also McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961) ("A statutory
discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived
to justify it."); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970) ("In the area of
economics and social welfare, a State does not violate the Equal Protection Clause
merely because the classifications made by its law are imperfect. If the classification
has some 'reasonable basis,' it does not offend the Constitution .... ").
"See San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 104 (1973) (Marshall,
J., dissenting). See also McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191 (1964) ("Normally
* * . the legislative judgment ... is given the benefit of every conceivable circumstance which might suffice to characterize the classification as reasonable rather than
arbitrary and invidious.").
"San Antonio School District v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 16 (1973).
"Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969). See also Kramer v. Union Free
School District, 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969); Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383
U.S. 663 (1966). "[Wlhere fundamental rights and liberties are asserted under the
Equal Protection Clause, classifications which might invade or restrain them must be
closely scrutinized and carefully confined." Id. at 670.
"Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972). For example, consistent with the
custom that courts will ordinarily defer to the judgment of the legislatures in areas of
commercial legislation, a state statute which prohibits opticians from fitting or duplicating lenses without a prescription, while exempting sellers of ready-to-wear glasses
from such a requirement, need only meet the traditional test of having some "reasonable basis," not wholly arbitrary. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
But when a criminal statute prohibits unmarried men and women of different
races from occupying and habitually living in the same room in the nighttime, while
not so prohibiting similar activity between members of the same race, the statute must
be examined under the strict equal protection standard. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379
U.S. 184 (1964).
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the contitutional "right to travel."'" In Shapiro v. Thompson,'7 the
Court affirmed three district court decisions and held unconstitutional various state and District of Columbia statutory provisions
requiring satisfaction of a one-year durational residence requirement
prior to application for welfare assistance. The main justification
offered for the waiting period was that it served as a "protective
device," deterring indigents from entering the particular jurisdiction,
and thereby preserving the fiscal integrity of the state welfare programs. Citing the long history of the constitutionally guaranteed right
to interstate travel, the Court dismissed such a proposed state objective as "constitutionally impermissible."' 8 Because the denial of welfare assistance penalized exercise of the fundamental right to travel,
the Court invoked the strict equal protection test and discounted
"As yet there has been no definitive determination of the particular constitutional
provision guaranteeing the right to travel interstate. See Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S.
(6 Wall.) 35 (1868); Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 282 (1849). See also Aptheker
v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964) and Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958)
(basing protection of the right on the Due Process Clause of Fifth Amendment); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941) (Commerce Clause); Twining v. New Jersey,
211 U.S. 78 (1908) (Privileges and Immunities Clause of Fourteenth Amendment);
Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168 (1868) (Privileges and Immunities Clause of Art. IV). It
is nevertheless agreed that the right exists, and is "fundamental":
The constitutional right to travel from one State to another...
occupies a position fundamental to the concepts of our Federal
Union. . . . [Fireedom to travel throughout the United States has
long been recognized as a basic right under the Constitution ...
Although there have been recurring differences in emphasis within the
Court as to the source of the constitutional right of interstate travel
. . . [aill have agreed that the right exists.
United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757-59 (1966) [Footnotes omitted].
For discussion of suggested sources of the travel right, see Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618, 666-71 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (concluding that the right is derived from the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment).
7394 U.S. 618 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Shapiro].
"Id. at 629-31. The Court found "weighty evidence that exclusion from the jurisdiction of the poor who need or may need relief was the specific objective of these
provisions." Id. at 628. Since Shapiro, many defenders of residence requirements have
attempted to limit application of its holding on the basis of this dicta, claiming that
similar effects were unobjectionable when merely by-products of legitimate state objectives. See, e.g., Starns v. Malkerson, 326 F. Supp. 234, 237 (D. Minn. 1970), aff'd
mem., 401 U.S. 985 (1971), discussed at note 34 infra.
After rejecting the state purpose of deterring indigents from entering the state,
alternative justifications of excluding those persons who migrate to states solely to
secure larger payments, and limiting benefits to "old" residents who previously contributed to the community through taxes were similarly declared invalid by the
Shapiro Court. 405 U.S. at 631-32.
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other proposed administrative and related state objectives' 9 as insufficient to warrant the "invidious classification." 2 In the Court's view
the durational residence requirements amounted to an unconstitutional denial of equal protection under the strict scrutiny test.2'
The concept of the right to travel was substantially broadened by
2
In Dunn, a law professor
the Supreme Court in Dunn v. Blumstein.1
who was denied voter registration because of his recent arrival in the
state successfully challenged Tennessee's one-year durational residence requirement for voting. Relying on Shapiro, the Court again
applied the more exacting equal protection test.2 3 Here strict scrutiny
was doubly applicable since the residence requirement infringed
upon two fundamental personal rights, the right to vote as well as the
right to travel.
Tennessee's contention that the compelling state interest test was
appropriate only where there was actual deterrence of the right to
"The claim that the residence requirement facilitated budget planning was unsupported by the evidence; actual reliance was placed on other methods in budget estimation. The contention that the requirement provided proof of residence was rebutted by
the observation that residence (i.e., physical presence and the intent to remain), and
the one-year requirement were separate and distinct prerequisites, and that the facts
relevant to a determination of residence were routinely investigated by welfare authorities. As for prevention of fraudulent receipt of benefits from more than one jurisdiction,
far less drastic means were available. Finally, the proposition that the residence requirement encouraged prompt entry of new residents into the labor force was unacceptable, as it was not similarly directed toward long-time residents. 394 U.S. at 633-38.
2

DId.

2ISignificantly, the Shapiro majority expressly limited its findings to the realm of
welfare:
We imply no view of the validity of waiting-period or residence requirements determining eligibility to vote, eligibility for tuition-free
education, to obtain a license to practice a profession, to hunt or fish,
and so forth. Such requirementsmay promote compelling state interests on the one hand, or on the other, may not be penalties upon the
exercise of the constitutional right of interstate travel.
Id. at 638 n.21 (emphasis added in latter sentence). The effectiveness of this limitation
was questioned by Chief Justice Warren who felt that the decision "reveals only the
top of the iceberg. . . . Lurking beneath are the multitude of situations in which
States have imposed residence requirements. . . . Although the Court takes pains to
avoid acknowledging the ramifications of its decision, its implications cannot be ignored." Id. at 654-55 (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
-405 U.S. 330 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Dunn].
2I'he Court initially distinguished between residency and durational residency
requirements. Id. at 334. "Residency" normally means domiciliary residency, i.e.,
physical presence coupled with the intent to remain indefinitely. A durational residence requirement requires "residency," maintained over a particular length of time.
See notes 48-50 and accompanying text infra.
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travel was labelled by the Court "a fundamental misunderstanding
of the law." 4 Explaining that Shapiro was not premised upon a finding that denial of welfare actually deterred travel, Justice Marshall
reiterated that the strict equal protection test would be applicable
whenever a classification served to penalize the exercise of the travel
right.2 Since durational residence requirements "impermissibly condition and penalize the right to travel by imposing their prohibitions
-21
on only those persons who have recently exercised that right ....
they are invalid unless necessary to promote a compelling state interest. The one-year voting requirement was found to be too imprecise
in furthering the state interests of prevention of fraudulent voting and
assurance of knowledgeable voters,2 and was therefore not necessary
under the strict test.
Both Dunn and Shapiro stressed the fundamental nature of the
right to travel and the applicability of the strict equal protection test
in determining the validity of statutes penalizing the right. However,
since these cases were concerned specifically with residence requirements for voting and welfare, extension of their underlying rationale
to similar requirements in the divorce realm has not been universal,
and inconsistent decisions have resulted.? A threshold question is
11405 U.S. at 339. Tennessee attempted to confine Shapiroto instances in which
the specific objective of the residence requirement was to deter travel (e.g., dissuading
indigents from entering the state), arguing that the voter residency requirement did
not seek to accomplish such an objective. The state argued further that strict scrutiny
was proper only when evidence of actual deterrence existed. The Court answered that
"it is irrelevant whether disenfranchisement or denial of welfare is the more potent
deterrent to travel." Id.
"Id. at 340. The Court further stated that the right to travel was an "unconditional
personal right." Id. at 341.
111d. at 342. The Court arguably referred here to all durational residence laws. See
Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970): "By definition, the imposition of a durational
residence requirement operates to penalize those persons, and only those persons,
who have exercised their constitutional right of interstate migration." Id. at 238.
(Brennan, White and Marshall, JJ., concurring and dissenting).
27
Maintaining the purity of the ballot box was a legitimate and compelling goal,
but less restrictive methods were available. The Court pointed to various provisions
of the Tennessee Code dealing specifically with voter fraud. The State's purported
fraud investigation rationale was rebutted (registration cut-off was 30 days before
election, thus one-year residency requirement does not increase fraud investigation
time), and the "conclusive presumption" of nonresidency was found violative of equal
protection. 405 U.S. at 345-54. See Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965). The state
purpose of assuring a knowledgeable electorate similarly failed to substantiate the
imposition of the one-year waiting period, due in part to impermissible objectives, but
primarily to the imprecision of the classification. 405 U.S. at 354-60.
'Compare cases cited in note 5 with those in note 6 supra.
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whether the traditional or strict standard should be applied to durational residence requirements for divorce.
In state courts, 9 as well as federal district courts, 3 disagreement
and confusion surround the process of determining the proper test for
evaluating durational residence requirements. Decisions of the Supreme Court have not eliminated the uncertainty. In Shapiro the
Court purposely restricted its holding to residence requirements for
receiving welfare, stating that other requirements "may not be penalties" upon the right to travel.3' However, Justice Marshall's language
in Dunn indicates that all residence requirements penalize the fundamental right to travel, and therefore must be examined under the
compelling state interest test.32 Even the slightest penalization will
purportedly trigger strict scrutiny.3 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court
has summarily affirmed three-judge court decisions upholding a oneyear residence requirement for receiving in-state tuition rates," and
2
See, e.g., Coleman v. Coleman, 32 Ohio St. 2d 155, 291 N.E.2d 530 (1972);
Whitehead v. Whitehead, 53 H. 302, 492 P.2d 939 (1972).
3'See cases cited note 4 supra and notes 34-36 infra.

3'See note 21 supra.
3'See text accompanying notes 25 and 26 supra.
405 U.S. at 340. See, e.g., Mon Chi Heung Au v. Lum, 360 F. Supp. 219, 221 n.8
(D. Hawaii 1973); Shiffman v. Askew, 359 F. Supp. 1225, 1232 (M.D. Fla. 1973). '
I'Starns v. Malkerson, 326 F. Supp. 234 (D. Minn. 1970), aff'd mem., 401 U.S. 985
(1971). The Minnesota district court upheld a University of Minnesota regulation requiring one year of residence prior to qualification for in-state tuition rates under the
traditional standard. The court distinguished Shapiro on two grounds: (1) that, unlike
the welfare residency requirement, the one-year waiting period for lower tuition rates
did not have as its specific objective exclusion of out-of-state students, and (2) that
t his requirement entailed no denial of the basic necessities of life. The court concluded
that the waiting period would not deter persons from entering the state to attend the
University, there was no infringement of a fundamental right, and therefore the strict
standard was inapplicable. 326 F. Supp. at 237-41.
Although the Supreme Court did not pass specifically on the appropriateness of
the equal protection test applied by the district court, it is reasonable to presume tacit
approval. Had the Court itself applied the strict standard, it is unlikely that a oneyear residence requirement would have been found "precise."
Although Dunn was decided subsequent to the affirmation, Starns was thereafter
reaffirmed in Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 452 n.9 (1973). In this case, the Court
used only a due process analysis in invalidating a Connecticut statute which classified
all students who were non-residents at the time they applied for admission to the state
university system as non-residents for the entire period of their attendance. In defining
the scope of its holding, the Court stated, "[n]or should our decision be construed to
deny a State the right to impose on a student, as one element in demonstrating bona
fide residence, a reasonable durational residency requirement .
Id. at 452. Contrasting its decision with the Starns case, the Court noted:
[The Connecticut statute prevents a student . . . from ever rebutting the presumption of nonresidence during the entire time that he
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a six-month residence requirement for admission to the bar,35 both of
36
which were measured under the traditional equal protection test.
These affirmations by the Supreme Court would seem to weaken the
Dunn dicta. They indicate that imposition of a residence requirement
does not, by its very nature, automatically penalize the right to
travel. Apparently, the nature of the underlying right restricted and
the consequences of the restriction determine whether the right to
travel is penalized by a particular residence requirement, and thus
which equal protection test is applicable.3 7 Denial or delay of the right
remains a student ....

Under Minnesota's durational residency re-

quirement, a student could qualify for in-state rates by living within
the State for a year in student status ....
Id. at 453 n.9; accord, Hasse v. Board of Regents of the University of Hawaii, 363 F.
Supp. 677 (D. Hawaii 1973) (upholding a one-year residence requirement as prerequisite to qualification as resident for tuition and admission purposes, relying on Starns
and Vlandis); Sturgis v. State of Washington, F. Supp. - (W.D. Wash. June
21, 1973), aff'd mem., 42 U.S.L.W. 3326 (U.S. Dec. 4, 1973) (No. 73-483) (upholding
one-year residence requirement for in-state tuition purposes); Kirk v. Board of Regents
of Univ. of California, 273 Cal. App. 2d 430, 78 Cal. Rptr. 260 (1969), appealdismissed,
396 U.S. 554 (1970).
3Suffling v. Bondurant, 339 F. Supp. 257 (D.N.M. 1972), aff'd mem. sub nom.
Rose v. Bondurant, 409 U.S. 1020 (1972). Note however that the requirement here was
for only six months. Also, although using the traditional standard of "reasonableness,"
the district court nevertheless expressed the view that the state's interest was compelling. 339 F. Supp. at 260. But see Keenan v. Board of Law Examiners, 317 F. Supp.
1350 (E.D.N.C. 1970) (one-year residence requirement prior to taking bar exam invalidated under strict standard). See generally Note, The Constitutionalityof State Residency Requirements for Admission to the Bar, 71 MICH. L. REv. 838 (1973).
"6But the Court recently affirmed another three-judge court decision upholding a seven-year residence requirement for qualification as a candidate for state governor, measured at the district level under the strict test. Chimento v. Stark, 353 F.
Supp. 1211 (D.N.H. 1973), aff'd mem., 414 U.S. 802 (1973). In this case, however, the
district court found the strict standard applicable primarily because the requirement
limited the voters in their choice of candidates, and determined that the right to travel
was not infringed. 353 F. Supp. at 1214-18. A concurring opinion noted: "I have difficulty, however, with the holding that the . . . so-called 'compelling interest test'
applies with all its vigor. . . . Actually what I believe the Court is doing (and quite
properly so) is to apply ordinary equal protection standards-weighing the plaintiff's
right to hold office against the countervailing right of the bodypolitik to establish
reasonable nondiscriminatory standards for those who would aspire to represent it in
highest office." Id. at 1218 (Campbell, C.J., concurring).
"The situation is further confused by indications that the Supreme Court may be
deviating from the two-tier equal protection test, see notes 11-15 and accompanying
text supra, and applying a more stringent version of the traditional test. See Gunther,
Forward:In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer
Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. Rev. 1 (1972). See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438 (1972); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). In declaring invalid an Idaho statute
which discriminated on the basis of sex, the Court did not invoke strict scrutiny, but
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to vote,3 or to receive welfare "9 by means of a residence requirement
penalizes the right to travel, necessitating implementation of the
strict standard. Similar delay of qualification for in-state tuition
rates 0 or admission to the bar" may not amount to a penalty on the
travel right, thereby allowing examination under the traditional
equal protection test. The distinction is presumably based on findings that the latter delays do not frustrate immediate needs, nor
infringe upon sacred constitutional rights."
Of primary importance, therefore, in deciding which equal protection standard should be applied to test the legitimacy of a particular
residence requirement, is determining whether the resultant restriction amounts to a penalty on the right to travel. Alternatively, if one
reasons that all durational residence requirements, for whatever purpose, penalize the right to travel to some extent, the task becomes
one of determining the degree of penalization which requires invocation of the strict equal protection standard." Whichever approach is
employed, it would appear that the effect of a particular residence
requirement on the right to travel must be determined in order to
decide which equal protection test is appropriate." In this respect,
the nature of the underlying right-be it the right to vote, to receive
rather used such a reinforced version of the traditional test. "A classification 'must be
reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair
and substantial relationshipto the objective of the legislation'. . . ." Id. at 76, citing
Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920) (emphasis added). But cf. San
Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), where the Court returned to
the traditional standard of whether a challenged state action "rationally furthers a
legitimate state purpose or interest." Id. at 55. See also Mr. Justice White's concurring
opinion in Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973): "lit is clear that we employ not
just one, or two, but ... a 'spectrum of standards in reviewing discrimination allegedly violative of the Equal Protection Clause'...." Id. at 458 (White, J., concurring).
For a summary of these developments, see San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-110 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
3Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
3"Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
4OStarns v. Malkerson, 326 F. Supp. 234 (D. Minn. 1970), aff'd mem., 401 U.S. 985
(1971); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973).
"Suffling v. Bondurant, 339 F. Supp. 257 (D.N.M. 1972), aff'd mem. sub noam.
Rose v. Bondurant, 409 U.S. 1020 (1972).
'2See, e.g., Starns v. Malkerson, 326 F. Supp. 234, 238 (D. Minn. 1970), aff'd
mem., 401 U.S. 985 (1971).
'See, e.g., Suffling v. Bondurant, 339 F. Supp. 257 (D.N.M. 1972), a/f'd mem. sub
nom. Rose v. Bondurant, 409 U.S. 1020 (1972), where the district court, using the
traditional test, stated that the six-month residence requirement did not "unduly
penalize" the right to travel interstate. 339 F. Supp. at 260.
"Cf. Note, The Problem of the "Newcomer's Divorce," 30 MD. L. REv. 367, 372
(1970).
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welfare, or to obtain a divorce-and the extent to which it is restricted must be considered. Certainly the relative importance attributed to the underlying right restricted by a residence requirement,
and the extent to which that right is vested, will largely determine
the degree of indirect infringement of the right to travel. Similarly,
the extent to which exercise of that underlying right is restrained-whether it is partially qualified or totally prohibited, and
the duration of its inhibition-will influence the restrictive effect of
a particular residence requirement on the right to travel.
Initially it would appear that in examining durational residence
requirements for divorce the district courts have disregarded the individual effects of the requirements on the travel right. There is apparent agreement among the district courts that under the assumed
authority of Dunn, divorce residence requirements penalize the right
to travel and hence are subject to strict scrutiny. 5 The disagreement
as to the validity of divorce residence requirements emanates not
from a dispute over which equal protection standard should be applied, but from divergent interpretations and applications of the
strict equal protection test. However, application of the strict test
may deviate to the extent that a less stringent test is in essence
applied, and the strict scrutiny test invoked in name only. This process of qualifying the compelling interest test has occurred as some
courts have analyzed the effects of particular divorce residence requirements on the right to travel.
A rigorous application of the "compelling interest" test seemingly
dictates the result recently reached in Mon Chi Heung Au v. Lum,"
in which a three-judge district court found Hawaii's one-year divorce
residence requirement 7 violative of the equal protection clause. The
court first distinguished between domicile and durational residency
requirements, 8 each a distinct prerequisite under the statute. A re"There is considerably less agreement among state courts. See Whitehead v.
Whitehead, 53 H. 302, 492 P.2d 939 (1972). Decided before Dunn, this case applied
the traditional test and upheld a one-year divorce residence requirement-since invalidated in Mon Chi Heung Au v. Lum, 360 F. Supp. 219 (D. Hawaii 1973)-relying
on a finding that the requirement did not "deter" travel. In a recent decision upholding
a one-year residence requirement for divorce, the Minnesota Supreme Court cited
Vlandis and Starns (discussed at note 34 supra) to support application of the traditional test. Davis v. Davis, 210 N.W.2d 221 (Minn. 1973). See Coleman v. Coleman,
32 Ohio St. 2d 155, 291 N.E.2d 530 (1972); Porter v. Porter, 112 N.H. 403, 296 A.2d
900 (1972).
"1360 F. Supp. 219 (D. Hawaii 1973).
"1HAWAII REv. STAT. § 580-1 (1968).
"360 F. Supp. at 221.
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quirement of domicile49 was constitutionally unobjectionable since a
finding of domicile guaranteed jurisdiction to grant a divorce." But
the additional requirement of durational residency unnecessarily discriminated against recently arrived individuals with honest intentions of making Hawaii their home. The resulting infringement of the
fundamental right to travel precluded application of the traditional
equal protection standard and necessitated strict scrutiny."
After rejecting outright several state purposes offered to justify
the waiting period,5 2 the court examined more thoroughly the proposed interest in preventing fraudulent assertions of domicile. This
interest was held to be clearly compelling. Also, the court interpreted
Hawaii's residence requirement as effectively deterring those persons
most likely to frustrate the state's interest in restricting the exercise
of divorce jurisdiction to valid domiciliaries. 3 However, the statute
failed the equal protection test for two reasons: it was not "tailored"
with "precision," 54 and it created an impermissible "conclusive pre"Domicile is established by physical presence in a state with the intention of
making it one's home. Wymelenberg v. Syman, 328 F. Supp. 1353, 1356 n.5 (E.D. Wis.
1971); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE CONFLICT OF LAws §§ 15, 16 and 18 (1971).
"1360F. Supp. at 221. See Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945) and
note 58 infra.
51Dunn's suggestion that all durational residence requirements were measurable
by the strict standard was given a literal reading. Comparing the previous state court
decision concerning the same statute, Whitehead v. Whitehead, 53 H. 302, 492 P.2d
939 (1972), the court observed that
the traditional standard was used on the rationale that the stricter
standard applies only when travel is actually deterred or the penalty
on the interstate movement is the deprivation of a right independently
fundamental. But these two propositions were specifically rejected by
the Dunn court, which then unequivocally stated that "durational
residency laws must be measured by a strict equal protection test"
360 F. Supp. at 221 n.8.
5Prevention of impulsive newcomer divorces, allotment of sufficient time for gathering data required for custody decisions, and deference to states with superior interests in the marital relationships were unpersuasive state interests. 360 F. Supp. at 22123. With respect to all three considerations, durational residence requirements were a
"patently blunderbuss approach to problems more susceptible to 'tailored', 'less drastic means.'" Id. at 222.
' 3 rhe court mentioned forum shoppers, transients, and persons willing to perjure
themselves as to domiciliary intent, but not on the objective matter of length of
residence, as those most threatening that interest. Id.
"In lieu of the residence requirement, an overbroad measure which restricted the
rights of valid domiciliaries, the court suggested such indicia as home ownership,
existence of permanent employment, and auto registration to substantiate domicile.
Id.
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sumption"55 of nonresidency."
The question of domicile57 raised by the Hawaii court is central
to the dispute over the validity of divorce residency requirements.
Juxtaposed are the state's interest in ensuring that its divorce decrees
merit full faith and credit in other jurisdictions,"8 and the bona fide
domiciliary's desire to gain access to divorce courts immediately upon
arriving in the forum state. Since the validity of domicile may be
contested by collateral attack, 9 and due to the subjective nature of
domiciliary intent, a state quite predictably will desire substantial
proof of that intent. Although a specific durational residence is acceptable as evidence of valid domiciliary intent, the Hawaii court
reasoned that since domicile may exist the instant an individual
MId. The c rt cited Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965), to illustrate such an
impermissible presumption. In that case, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a
provision of the Texas constitution prohibiting members of the armed forces who
moved to Texas from ever voting in elections in the state, for the duration of their
membership in the armed forces.
-'The
court finally labelled its holding a "narrow" one, specifically exempting
therefrom state requirements that divorce petitioners produce tangible evidence of
genuine domiciliary intent. 360 F. Supp. at 222.
"Note 49 supra.
"-"Underour system of law, judicial power to grant a divorce-jurisdiction, strictly
speaking-is founded on domicil." Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 229
(1945). "The domicil of one spouse within a State gives power to that State . . . to
dissolve a marriage wheresoever contracted." Id. at 229-30. See Williams v. North
Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 298 (1942); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE CoNFLIcT OF LAWS
§ 71 (1971). Under the full faith and credit clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, a divorce
decree granted in one state must be honored in all other states, only if the court
granting the decree properly had jurisdiction. Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. at
229. "[Tjhe decree of divorce is a conclusive adjudication of everything except the
jurisdictional facts upon which it is founded, and domicil is a jurisdictional fact." Id.
at 232.
It is not clear whether domicile, although a sufficient basis for jurisdiction, is a
necessaryjurisdictional basis for a decree of divorce. Compare Alton v. Alton, 207 F.2d
667 (3d Cir. 1953), vacated as moot, 347 U.S. 610 (1954) (domicile necessary) with
Wheat v. Wheat, 229 Ark. 842, 318 S.W.2d 793 (1958) (three-month durational residence sufficient) and Klandt v. Klandt, 156 N.W.2d 72 (N.D. 1968) (twelve months
residence sufficient).
51In an ex parte proceeding, the absent spouse or another state may challenge the
jurisdiction of the granting state. 325 U.S. at 230 (1945). However, res judicata will
bar collateral attack by a spouse if both spouses were within the personal jurisdiction
of the state, and the issue of domicile was actually litigated, Davis v. Davis, 305 U.S.
32 (1938), or both parties were represented by counsel. Coe v. Coe, 334 U.S. 378 (1948);
Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948). The same may hold merely if the respondent
has been personally served. See Cook v. Cook, 342 U.S. 126, 127 (1951); Johnson v.

Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581, 587 (1951);

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS

§ 73, comments and cases cited therein (1971).
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enters the forum state,"0 a requirement of durational residence forced
even bona fide domiciliaries to satisfy an unnecessary prerequisite,
and hence was invalid under the compelling state interest test.0 '
Invocation of the strict equal protection test does not automatically mandate a finding that divorce residence requirements violate
equal protection. In Sosna v. Iowa,12 a divided three-judge court recently upheld Iowa's one-year durational residence requirement for
divorce" under a purported application of the compelling state interest test. The majority distinguished Dunn and Shapiro on the basis
that "[u]nlike voting or welfare, the concept of a divorce is not a
constitutional right, nor is it a basic necessity to survival."6 The
court emphasized that divorce was a "creature of statute," with absolute power of fegulation vested in the state. 5 Such purposes as fostering the re-examination of the marriage, avoiding state interference in
marriages in which it had no interest, and preventing Iowa from
becoming a "divorce mill" for transients fraudulently asserting domicile, were found sufficient to make Iowa's interest in the requirement
compelling. 6 But, unlike the Hawaii court in Mon Chi Heung Au v.
Lum, which invalidated a one-year requirement as being imprecise, 7
the court here disregarded that part of the strict test requiring "least
drastic means" for furthering the compelling interest. Instead, the
Sosna majority cited a previous state case68 apparently for the proposition that variations in the duration of residence requirements for
divorce did not affect their validity.69 Again, ensuring domicile was
11360 F. Supp. at 221 n.7; Alton v. Alton, 207 F.2d 667, 671 (3d Cir. 1953) vacated
as moot 347 U.S. 610 (1954); White v. Tennant, 31 W. Va. 790, 8 S.E. 596 (1888). But
see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE CONFLICr OF LAWS § 16, comment b (1971).
" 1Cf. Porter v. Porter, 112 N.H. 403, 296 A.2d 900 (1972). In that case the state
court upheld a requirement of one year durational residency in a divorce action if the
defendant spouse was neither domiciled nor served with process within the state.
Although the court rested its holding primarily on fairness to the absent spouse, it is
clear that the requirement also served as a guard against collateral attack. See note
59 supra. The New Hampshire court disregarded the right to travel, on the basis that
the requirement was distinguishable from that in Shapiro.
62360 F. Supp. 1182 (N.D. Iowa 1973), prob. juris. noted, 42 U.S.L.W. 3468 (U.S.
Feb. 19, 1974) (No. 73-762) (appealed to the Supreme Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1253).
6'IOwA CODE ANN. § 598.6 (Supp. 1972).
11360 F. Supp. at 1184.
651d.
1Id. at 1184-85.
67See text accompanying note 54 supra.
"Whitehead v. Whitehead, 53 H. 302, 492 P.2d 939 (1972). See note 45 supra.
G2360 F. Supp. at 1185 n.8 citing Whitehead v. Whitehead, 492 P.2d at 948. The
court cited Whitehead for its statement that there was no material difference between
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the paramount state interest. Although not here expressed in terms
of guaranteeing full faith and credit,"0 preventing "divorce mill" status and deferring to other states' interests were also necessary incidents of exercising divorce jurisdiction only over bona fide domiciliaries.7 '
Dissenting in Sosna, Chief Judge McManus observed that the
majority's distinction between voting and welfare situations and divorce was drawn to justify use of some "unidentified test, less stringent than strict equal protection. 7' 2 The dissenting opinion considered Iowa's interest in not becoming a divorce mill the only truly
compelling state interest, and concluded that requiring divorce petitioners to bear the burden of proof of valid domicile was a viable, less
3
restrictive alternative to blanket prohibition.1
In both Sosna v. Iowa and Mon Chi HeungAu v. Lum the district
courts recited application of the compelling state interest equal protection standard. Both courts found such a compelling interest in
maintaining their respective one-year durational residence requirements so as to verify the true domiciliary status of their divorce
residence requirements of 90 days and one year. Whitehead at 948. The section of
Whitehead mentioned pertained to the latest draft of the UNIFORM DIVORCE Aar (by
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws) which provided
for entry of a divorce decree if
the court finds that one of the parties has been a resident of this State,
or is a member of the armed services who has been stationed in this
State, for 90 days next preceding the commencement of this proceeding or the entry of the decree ....
Id. at 947 (emphasis.added).
The Whitehead court had cited the draft for the proposition that despite Shapiro,
the concept of residence requirements for divorce was still readily accepted. That court
then reasoned that if a 90-day requirement was acceptable, so was a one-year residence
requirement since the duration of such a requirement was "a matter entirely within
legislative discretion." Id. at 948. Cf. Coleman v. Coleman, 32 Ohio St. 2d 155, 291
N.E.2d 530 (1972). In upholding Ohio's one-year divorce residence requirement, the
court stressed the state's power to oversee the marriage institution, and found that the
requirement did not penalize the travel right, was supported by a compelling state
interest, and was "least restrictive." 291 N.E.2d at 534-36.
"°Cf. Mon Chi Heung Au v. Lum and text accompanying notes 52-59 supra.
"That Iowa adheres to a "no-fault" concept of divorce may have contributed to
the majority's concern here. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.5 (Supp. 1972).
72360 F. Supp. at 1185 (McManus, C.J., dissenting).
' 3The state interest of encouraging re-examination of the marriage by the spouses
was discredited somewhat by the observation that the statute did not impose the oneyear requirement when respondent was a resident of Iowa and personally served. Thus,
unless personal service was impossible in Iowa, durational residence was required only
when the spouses were living in different states, a situation not conducive to reconciliation. Id. at 1186-87.
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litigants. Yet the courts reached totally contradictory results. The
finding in Mon Chi Heung Au v. Lum is not startling, given the strict
nature of the test and its literal reading by the Hawaii court. Under
such an application, a residence requirement no matter how precise
may not represent the "least restrictive means" of guaranteeing domiciliary intent, because it can always be eliminated in favor of a
requirement that divorce petitioners submit proof of that intent. The
Hawaii court applied the strict test dutifully, ignoring the nature of
the underlying right to divorce.
On the other hand, the Sosna court did look to the nature of that
underlying right, distinguishing divorce from voting and welfare: the
right to divorce has not yet attained the status of a "fundamental
right,"" as has the right to vote, nor does it normally present the
immediate necessity likely in the right to receive welfare. However,
the Iowa majority overlooked the "least drastic means" aspect of the
strict equal protection test. The court contended rather that the duration of the residence requirement was of minimal import and subject to legislative determination. 75 In this manner the Sosna court
ignored the interests of new residents seeking divorce.
A less extreme approach to the analysis of divorce residence requirements was espoused in the recent decision of Shiffman v.
Askew, 76 in which Florida's six-month durational residency requirement for divorce was found constitutionally sound.77 Tracing the recognition of the unique status of marriage and divorce in society
through the major Supreme Court decisions, 7 the court offered three
premises: (1) the field of marriage and divorce is left to individual
state regulation; (2) this regulation is vital to implementation of the
state's own policies, as well as in avoiding intrusion on the similar
rights and regulation of other states; (3) the states have a vital interest in assuring that their divorce decrees are accorded full faith and
credit, particularly to protect the personal and property rights of
third parties. 7 Acknowledging that under the presumed instruction
7

But see United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 444-46 (1973), where there are
intimations
that the right to a divorce may be fundamental. See note 113 infra.
75See note 69 supra.
76359 F. Supp. 1225 (M.D. Fla. 1973).
"FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.021 (1971). It was charged that the residence requirement
denied equal protection, violated the right to travel, breached the privileges and immunities clause, and denied due process and access to the courts. 359 F. Supp. at 122829.
7Id. at 1229-31.
7
Id. at 1231.
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of Dunn, 0 the degree of restriction on travel was irrelevant as far as
"triggering" 8' strict scrutiny, the court noted:
[T]he degree of the restriction on travel and the nature of the
right qualified by the residency requirement (a suit for divorce
or welfare assistance or the right to vote), must ultimately be
weighed and balanced in relation to the interest served by the
restriction. Otherwise, the standard by which to measure the
''compelling" nature of such interest would be decimated and
the final determination of constitutionality would be made in
82
a sterile vacuum.
The state had a compelling interest in requiring a provable durational residency as objective evidence of domicile to assure the accordance of full faith and credit and to maintain a noninterfering
position with its neighbors.8s The court also observed that in Dunn,
while the one-year voter residency requirement was set aside, an
accompanying 30-day waiting period84 was effectively approved by
the Supreme Court as furthering a compelling state interest. The
latter observation and a recent decision in which the Supreme Court
upheld under strict scrutiny a 50-day residence requirement for state
and local elections in Arizona85 lent support to the finding that a sixmonth residence requirement for divorce was valid. Imposition of the
requirement resulted in a negligible penalty on the right to travel. 6
The court contended that divorce residence requirements, becAuse of
their inextricable relationship with domicile, were peculiarly purposeful.8Y Apparently a balancing of those interests served and those
infringed led the court to conclude that the six-month requirement
88
was appurtenant to a "duty" of the forum state.
"0 See text accompanying note 32 supra.
11359 F. Supp. at 1232.

11Id. at 1233.
"Id. at 1232.
"See note 27 supra.
"Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679 (1973).
1359 F. Supp. at 1235.

'The district court attempted to distinguish Shapiro and Dunn, the latter on the
basis of the existence of the 30-day registration cut-off, separate from the one-year
residence requirement, see note 27 supra; the former on the basis that welfare authorities customarily investigated new applicants. 359 F. Supp. at 1233-34.
"The court concluded:
The state must go slow, it must be careful, and when it undertakes to
act, it owes a duty to other states and other affected parties to make
a record in support of its judgment that will withstand collateral attack and merit full faith and credit. The Florida residency require-
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It would appear that the court in Shiffman v. Askew did not apply
the compelling state interest test as it was explained by the Supreme
Court in Shapiro and Dunn. After invoking strict scrutiny, the court
in essence reverted to a less rigorous test. The Florida court examined
the nature of the right to divorce and the extent of the restriction on
the right to travel, not to determine whether the strict test was initially applicable, but to temper application of that test. There is
considerable support for the contention that divorce residence requirements as short as six months burden the travel right so slightly
that they need not be examined under the compelling interest test at
all. 9 But unless and until the Supreme Court definitively rejects the
dicta in Dunn that all requirements must be examined under strict
scrutiny, many courts will continue to struggle within the confines of
that standard, qualifying its application to reach sound, equitable
results. In this light, the Florida court's approach of weighing and
balancing the numerous rights and interests affected by a residence
requirement for divorce, which does not substantially restrict the
right to travel, may represent the most meaningful process through
which its validity under the equal protection clause may be determined.
Constitutional objections to durational residence requirements for
divorce have not been confined to alleged violations of the equal
protection clause. An entirely new ground for attack developed when
the Supreme Court ruled in Boddie v. Connecticut" that a state may
not deny individuals access to its courts for the purpose of dissolving
their marriages, solely on account of their inability to pay required
filing fees. Speaking through Mr. Justice Harlan, the Court found
that "given the basic position of the marriage relationship in this
society's hierarchy of values and the concomitant state monopolization of the means for legally dissolving this relationship," 9' such a
92
denial was a violation of the due process clause.
ment. . . is not a "drastic means". . . either in terms of the length
of the residency period or in its effect upon the right it qualifies....
Time . . . is virtually irrelevant in the case of divorce. The penalty
to interstate travel is de minimis, and to the extent such penalty does
exist, it is justified by a compelling state interest.
Id. at 1235 (emphasis added).
"See text accompanying notes 31-42 supra.
9-401 U.S. 371 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Boddie].
"Id. at 374.
"2Stressing that access to the court here was an "exclusive precondition to the
adjustment of a fundamental human relationship," and that the state required
divorce-seekers to resort to its courts, the Court held that a state "may not, consistent
with the obligations imposed on it by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
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Attempts to extend the Boddie rationale to persons precluded by
residence requirements from maintaining divorce actions have followed. Initial disagreement arises over the applicability of Boddie,
where under filing fee requirements a divorce litigant is disadvantaged by indigency, to the realm of residence requirements, where the
divorce litigant is disadvantaged by recent arrival.13 The threshold
question then becomes whether due process is denied by the waiting
period.
The Boddie case is arguably distinguishable from the situation of
divorce residence requirements on a number of grounds. A distinction
may arise based on a determination that the prohibition declared
invalid in Boddie was a total denial to indigents of access to divorce
courts, whereas under residency laws there is only a limited durational denial to new residents. 4 That a new resident may be able to
sue for divorce in the state of former residence may also be a basis
for distinction.95 A state court 6 has denied application of Boddie on
the theory that divorce residency requirements are substantive, not
jurisdictional, and that failure to satisfy such substantive requirements does not deny access to the courts.97 In a recent district court
case upholding a one-year residence requirement for divorce, the maAmendment, pre-empt the right to dissolve this legal relationship without affording
all citizens access to the means it has prescribed for doing so." Id. at 383 (emphasis
added).
' 3Compare Larsen v. Gallogly, 361 F. Supp. 305 (D.R.I. 1973), appeal docketed,
42 U.S.L.W. 3257 (U.S. Oct. 23, 1973) (No. 73-678); Wymelenberg v. Syman, 328 F.
Supp. 1353 (E.D. Wis. 1971); Stottlemyer v. Stottlemyer, 224 Pa. Super. 123, 302 A.2d
830 (1973) (dissenting opinion); with Sosna v. Iowa, 360 F. Supp. 1182 (N.D. Iowa
1973), prob. juris noted, 42 U.S.L.W. 3468 (U.S. Feb. 19, 1974) (No. 73-762); Mon Chi
Heung Au v. Lum, 360 F. Supp. 219 (D. Hawaii 1973); Whitehead v. Whitehead, 53
H. 302, 492 P.2d 939 (1972).
"See Mon Chi Heung Au v. Lum, 360 F. Supp. 219, 220 n.3 (D. Hawaii 1973). The
court did not rule on the possible distinction as a due process finding was unnecessary
to the decision. The distinction may also be applicable as beteen long and short
durational residence requirements.
"Note, Family Law-The Constitutionality of State Durational Residence Requirementsfor Divorce 51 TEXAS L. REv. 585, 590 (1973).
"Whitehead v. Whitehead, 53 H. 302, 492 P.2d 939, 947 (1972).
'71d. The argument seems unreasonable, since whether a question of jurisdiction
or of substance, failure to satisfy a durational residence requirement for divorce results
in denial of a judicial remedy. See Larsen v. Gallogly, 361 F. Supp. 305, 307 (D.R.I.
1973). Most states label residence requirements as not jurisdictional. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 70, comment d and Reporter's Note (1971).
Compare White v. White, 138 Conn. 1, 81 A.2d 450 (1951) (durational residence requirement as jurisdictional); with Myers v. Myers, 210 S.W.2d 832 (Tex. Civ. App.
1948) and Hammond v. Hammond, 45 Wash. 2d 855, 278 P.2d 387 (1954) (durational
residence requirement not jurisdictional).
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jority apparently chose to ignore the Boddie analogy."
On the other hand, should it be determined that Boddie is solid
precedent with regard to durational residence requirements for divorce, a "countervailing state interest of overriding significance" 9
would be necessary to justify the denial of due process. Such a determination has been made by two district courts, each declaring unconstitutional their respective states' two-year durational residency requirements for divorce. 00 In a decision by a Wisconsin district court,
the exclusive nature of the remedy of divorce was decisive.", Stressing the inadequacies of the alternatives to dissolution, the court determined that the two-year waiting period constituted a denial of due
process. Because legal separation did not break the ties of the marriage bonds, it was not a meaningful alternative. 2 Annulment was
unsatisfactory because although voiding the marriage status, it required totally different grounds than for divorce.0 After examining
four state interests' 4 urged in defense of the requirement, the court
found that whether judged by the equal protection "compelling interest" test or by the due process "countervailing interest of overriding
significance" formula, Wisconsin's residence requirement for divorce
05
was unconstitutional.
In Larsen v. Gallogly,0 0 a district court recently employed both
equal protection and due process arguments in striking down another
"Sosna v. Iowa, 360 F. Supp. 1182, 1188 (N.D. Iowa 1973), prob. juris. noted, 42
U.S.L.W. :3468 (U.S. Feb. 19, 1974) (No. 73-762) (McManus, C.J., dissenting). The
apparent oversight may actually have been an intention to limit Boddie on the basis
of language in Mr. Justice Harlan's opinion, to the effect that persons were denied
judicial redress "solely" on the basis of poverty. However, in a recent decision the
Supreme Court denied the extension of Boddie principles to the situation of an indigent who was unable to pay filing fees for bankruptcy proceedings. United States v.
Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973). The decision should detract from any argument that Boddie
was decided solely on the basis of financial status, and thus rebut any such attempted
limitation.
91401 U.S. at 377.
,"Larsen v. Gallogly, 361 F. Supp. 305 (D.R.I. 1972), appeal docketed, 42
U.S.L.W. 3257 (U.S. Oct. 23, 1973) (No. 73-678); Wymelenberg v. Syman, 328 F. Supp.
1353 (E.D. Wis. 1971).
0
' Wymelenberg v. Syman, 328 F. Supp. 1353 (E.D. Wis. 1971).
2
11
1d. at 1355.
1Id.
"'The interests proposed were: (1) to deter those with marital problems from
entering the state; (2) to maintain marital stability; (3) to assure residence; (4) to
protect the state's reputation. Id. at 1355-56.
11Id. at 1356.
"'1361 F. Supp. 305 (D.R.I. 1973), appeal docketed, 42 U.S.L.W. 3257 (U.S. Oct.
23, 1973) (No. 73-678).
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two-year residence requirement for divorce. 07 In addition to finding
a penalty on the right to travel, the court interpreted Boddie as
mandating that once a state makes available a divorce remedy, every
state citizen must be given a "meaningful opportunity to be heard."''0
Since the residency requirement deprived the petitioner of such an
opportunity, due process was denied. Reciting then that the more
rigorous of either the due process or strict equal protection standards
must be met by the statute, the court analyzed the proffered state
interests and found that the equal protection standard was not met.,"
The two district court decisions extending the Boddie due process
analysis to invalidate divorce residence requirements may have inadvertently avoided, due to the nature of the requirements involved, the
possibility of a distinction which may be drawn between the facts of
Boddie and those of future cases involving shorter residence requirements. Although a two-year waiting period for newly arrived residents is so overbroad as to be considered akin to a total denial of
access to the courts, a shorter residence requirement may not be
interpreted as denying the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful
time. The court in Larsen v. Gallogly specifically suggested that a
shorter requirement might be permissible." 0 The applicability of a
Boddie due process argument to divorce residence requirements will
thus probably depend upon the length of the particular requirement."'
"71R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 15-5-12 (1956).
Io3361 F. Supp. at 308, citing Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. at 377. See generally

Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).
0
'Distinguishing between domicile and durational residency, the court discredited
proposed state interests in assuring proper use of state tax monies, preventing the state
from becoming a "divorce-mill," and ensuring valid jurisdiction so as to protect against
collateral attack. The two-year residence requirement was an overbroad means of
accomplishing those ends. A domicile inquiry at the divorce hearing and enactment
of statutes containing sanctions for perjury were suggested as alternative guarantees
of domicile. 361 F. Supp. at 309-10. The argument that the residence requirement
encouraged persons to re-examine their marriage relationship was not even "rational,"
and secretly-obtained divorces were already guarded against by statutes requiring
notice to respondent spouses. Id. The court held that no state interest of overriding
significance or of a compelling quality was shown. Id. at 310.
The court did not determine whether the strict equal protection standard or the
due process standard presented the more demanding test, noting that the distinction
between the two tests was "vague," and "muddy." Id. at 308-09. See, e.g., 401 U.S. at
383 (Douglas, J., concurring); Id. at 386 (Brennan, J., concurring in part) (both asserting that the equal protection clause could have controlled that decision). See also
United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973) and text accompanying note 98 supra, where
the Court returned to equal protection analysis of bankruptcy filing fees and indigents.
111361 F. Supp. at 309.
"'See, e.g., Davis v. Davis, 210 N.W.2d 221 (Minn. 1973). In upholding a one-year
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The imposition of residence requirements for divorce precipitates
a conflict between basic constitutional principles. The right to travel
interstate without penalization, and the right to judicial redress of
grievances-particularly the adjustment of fundamental human relationships-are well recognized, as is the right to be free from unwarranted discriminatory classifications." 2 Indeed, recent Supreme
Court dicta implies that there may be a fundamental right to divorce."' But equally acknowledged are the principles that a state may
control objects of its creation, particularly marriage and its dissolution,"' and may take necessary measures to ensure the validity of its
judicial decrees."15
The conflict may be resolved by examining the nature of the rights
and interests affected by particular residence requirements to determine the degree of penalization of the right to travel. Clearly, strict
application of the compelling state interest equal protection test
should result in the invalidation of most residence requirements for
divorce. However, even the strict test is not insurmountable"' and the
residence requirement for divorce the court countered a due process argument with the
observation that access to the courts was "only temporarily delayed." Id. at 227.
"'See notes 11-15 and accompanying text supra.
"'See United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973). Distinguishing Boddie from the
situation of bankruptcy, the Court stated:
The denial of access to the judicial forum in Boddie touched directly,
as has been noted, on the marital relationship and on the associational
interests that surround the establishment and dissolution of that relationship. On many occasions we have recognized the fundamental
importance of these interests under our Constitution.
409 U.S. at 444. The Court further noted that
[b]ankruptcy is hardly akin to free speech or marriage or to those
other rights, so many of which are imbedded in the First Amendment,
that the Court has come to regard as fundamental and that demand
the lofty requirement of a compelling governmental interest before
they may be significantly regulated.
Id. at 446. Mr. Justice Marshall questioned the implications of the Court's language.
Id. at 462 n.4 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
'"Marriage, as creating the most important relation in life, as having to do more
with the morals and civilization of a people than any other institution, has always been
subject to the control of the legislature." Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888).
Marriage is recognized as one of the "basic civil rights of man. . . . Fundamental to
the very existence and survival of the race." Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel Williamson,
316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). See also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 734-35 (1877). But this
power of the state over the marital status of its residents is not unlimited. 388 U.S. at
7-12.
,'See text accompanying notes 79 and 83 supra.
"'See, e.g., Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679 (1973); see text accompanying note 85
supra. That the test is not exact has been admitted; in Dunn, Justice Marshall said
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recent district court cases demonstrate the need for looking to the
extent of the restriction on the right to travel resulting from a given
requirement. Without such an inquiry, once it is determined that any
penalization of the right to travel exists, residence requirements of
vastly differing degrees may be treated alike.
From the standpoint of Supreme Court precedent, it would appear that the arguably broad implications of Dunn"7 have not negated the express limitation of Shapiro,"s and that these cases do not
mandate a finding that all divorce residence requirements are unconstitutional on equal protection grounds. Similarly, the Boddie due
process argument does not require that divorce residence requirements of all durations be invalidated. It is necessary, then, to distinguish between acceptable and unacceptable requirements.
One possible approach would be to invoke the traditional equal
protection test for residence requirements which are of such short
duration as not to penalize the travel right substantially, while applying the compelling state interest test to requirements which do sufficiently penalize the right."' Alternatively, the strict standard could
be applied to all residence requirements for divorce, but with a less
demanding requirement of necessity, a more relaxed interpretation of
"least drastic means."' 2 Whatever the method applied, when all considerations are weighed courts should recognize that some residence
requirements for divorce are constitutionally permissible. The interests of states in maintaining relatively short durational residence
requirements simply outweigh the slight penalization or restriction
imposed upon the divorce-seeking newcomer. These state interests
include, primarily, preserving the integrity of the marriage instituof the strict equal protection test: "[Legal 'tests' do not have the precision of mathematical formulas. The key words emphasize a matter of degree: that a heavy burden
of justification is on the State, and that the statute will be closely scrutinized in light
of its asserted purposes." 405 U.S. at 342-43. Chief Justice Burger remarked in the
same case: "Some lines must be drawn. To challenge such lines by the 'compelling
state interest' standard is to condemn them all. So far as I am aware, no state law has
ever satisfied this seemingly insurmountable standard, and I doubt one ever will,
because it demands nothing less than perfection." Id. at 363-64 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
"'See text accompanying notes 32 and 33 supra.
"'See note 21 supra.
"'Such a suggestion has been made to test the validity of state residence requirements for bar admission. Note, The Constitutionalityof State Residency Requirements for Admission to the Bar, 71 MICH. L. Rlv. 838 (1973).
"'This is essentially what the Florida court did in Shiffman, in balancing the
degree of restriction on the travel right and the nature of the right to a divorce against
the interests served by the six-month requirement. See text accompanying notes 7688 supra.
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tion and assuring valid jurisdiction to insulate the state's divorce
decrees from collateral attack."'
Of these state interests, preservation of marriages and furtherance
of reconciliation between spouses are probably not sufficient to justify
imposition of a blanket residence requirement. Such purposes may be
accomplished via waiting period or counseling requirements applicable to all divorce litigants. Opponents of divorce residence requirements argue further that the admittedly legitimate state interests of
preventing forum shopping and "divorce-mill" reputation, respecting
the rights of sister states, ensuring fairness to absent spouses and
third parties, preserving the integrity of a state's judicial system, and
even assuring that petitioner's rights and interests are finally and
conclusively determined, may all be accomplished merely by a finding of domicile, without the added requirement of durational residency.
If conclusive proof of domicile could effectively be obtained without extreme burden, the latter assertion would be persuasive. The
argument for divorce residence requirements would then be substantially rebutted. But the alternative indicia of domicile'2 are of questionable reliability,'1 and the administrative burden of ascertaining
the validity of domiciliary intent would be large, if not prohibitive.
Assorting and investigating the information offered would alone require some durational delay period.
In addition, were residence requirements to be totally barred,
methods might be devised whereby the alternative proof requirement
for domicile could be circumvented, statutory perjury sanctions notwithstanding. Divorce petitioners would be encouraged to perjure
themselves in attempting to make certain that their claims would be
heard. Implementation of such innovative measures as no-fault divorce laws might be curtailed, for fear that vast numbers of divorceseeking non-residents would flock to the no-fault states, fraudulently
claiming domiciliary intent. New conflicts and discriminations would
'"The other corollary interests usually offered in support of residence requirements
include: encouragement of re-examination and reconciliation by the spouses; fairness
to absent defendant-spouse; protection of possible third parties (children, heirs, etc.);
avoidance of intrusion on the rights and interests of other states; prevention of forumshopping, "quickie-divorces," and "divorce-mill" status-in general, preservation of
the state's reputation. See generally Note, Family Law-The Constitutionality of
State DurationalResidence Requirementsfor Divorce, 51 TExAs L. RFv. 585 (1973).
"'Factors which might be examined to determine domicile include home ownership, employment, voter registration, driver's license, auto registration, bank accounts,
membership in clubs and organizations. Note, The Problem of the "Newcomer's Divorce," 30 MD. L. REv. 367, 380 (1970).
"'See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 20, Special Note (1971).
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develop between divorce seekers themselves, precipitating new inequities.' 2 Alternatively, the administrative burden might prove to
be so large that the proof requirement would simply fall into disuse.
It is clear that the duration of the divorce residence requirement
is critical to its constitutional acceptability. Although the choice of
an acceptable duration is necessarily arbitrary and subject to the
objection voiced by Mr. Justice Blackmun in the Dunn case, '1 lines
must nevertheless be drawn somewhere.'26 The conclusions of the
well-reasoned judicial decisions' 2 and the determinations of legislatures' 2 may be of assistance. The Supreme Court has recently expressed its willingness to respect legislative judgments drawing lines
29
for limited durational residence requirements.'
The degree to which state durational residence requirements for
divorce are constitutionally valid will ultimately be judicially determined. Although a two-year requirement is clearly overbroad, a requirement of six months durational residence prior to institution of
a divorce action places little or no penalty on exercise of the right to
travel and should be found neither violative of the equal protection
clause nor a denial of due process. Because the decree of divorce has
such a potential impact and effect on so many rights and interests
'24For example, would treatment be the same for residents of four months, one of
whom owns his home and is gainfully employed, the other who rents monthly and who
just lost his job, even though both claim the intent to remain?
12With respect to the approval of the 30-day requirement, it was said: "[I]f
30
days pass constitutional muster, what of 35 or 45 or 75?" 405 U.S. at 363 (Blackmun,
J., concurring).
'251d. (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
' For example, in Shiffman v. Askew, 359 F. Supp. 1225 (M.D. Fla. 1973), the
court emphasized that the length of the six-month requirement was satisfactory; see
note 88 supra. Similarly, the court in Larsen v. Gallogly, 361 F. Supp. 305 (D.R.I.
1973), appeal docketed, 42 U.S.L.W. 3257 (U.S. Oct. 23, 1973) (No. 73-678) found
duration a possible turning point. See text accompanying note 108 supra.
'12 Wisconsin has replaced the statute declared invalid in Wymelenberg v.
Syman, 328 F. Supp. 1353 (E.D. Wis. 1971), with a six-month residence requirement,
as yet unchallenged. Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 247.05 (Supp. 1973). Compare the most
recent draft of the UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 302 (1973), requiring only
that domicile exist at commencement of the divorce action and be maintained for 90
days next preceding the findings by the court.
'"In Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679 (1973) the Court stated:
In the present case, we are confronted with a recent and amply justifiable legislative judgment that 50 days rather than 30 is necessary to
promote the State's important interest in accurate voter lists. The
Constitution is not so rigid that that determination and others like it
may not stand.
Id. at 681. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. at 655-77 (Harlan, J., dissenting).

